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That the Laws Shall Bind Equally on All:
Congressional and Executive Roles in
Applying Laws to Congress
Harold H. Bruff*
It was probably from [their] view of the encroach-
ing character of privilege, that the framers of our consti-
tution, in their care to provide that the laws shall bind
equally on all, and especially that those who make them
shall not exempt themselves from their operation, have
only privileged "Senators and Representatives" them-
selves from... "being questioned in any other place for
any speech or debate in either House."
Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice.'
This formulation of [the legislative privilege] was
the culmination of a long struggle for parliamentary
supremacy. Behind these simple phrases lies a history
of conflict between the Commons and the Tudor and
Stuart monarchs during which successive monarchs uti-
lized the criminal and civil law to suppress and intimi-
date critical legislators. Since the Glorious Revolution
in Britain, and throughout United States history, the
privilege has been recognized as an important protec-
tion of the independence and integrity of the
legislature.
Justice Harlan, in United States v. Johnson.2
To Jefferson, composing his parliamentary manual to
relieve the boredom of his vice-presidential duties, the con-
stitutional privilege that is accorded legislators seemed a
potential tool of congressional aggrandizement. Hence, its
* Rothschild Research Professor of Law, George Washington University.
The author is the Chair of the Congressional Process Committee, American Bar
Association Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, and a member
of the ABA's Task Force on Applying Federal Legislation to Congress. The views
expressed here are his own, and not those of any component of the ABA.
1. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: for the Use of the
Senate of the United States, in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 359 (Wilbur
S. Howell ed., 1988)(2d ed. 1812).
2. 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
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careful delineation would serve the overall balance of
power upon which our system rests. A narrow constitu-
tional privilege, ensuring that in most instances "the laws
shall bind equally on all," would also buttress a corollary
principle not found in the text of the Constitution, that the
lawmakers "shall not exempt themselves" from the laws
they enact.
Yet the modern Supreme Court understands that the
privilege serves another central postulate of our system by
preserving the autonomy of the legislature. In seventeenth
century England, that autonomy had been won at the cost
of much blood and the crowns of two kings.3 Without it, a
balance of power among coordinate branches could not
exist.
A current controversy surrounding the application of
law to Congress requires us to confront the conflict be-
tween these values. Separation of powers problems often
involve powerful opposing claims, such as the need to pre-
vent a branch's aggrandizement versus the need to preserve
its autonomy. For reasons that will appear, I attempt to ac-
commodate these values rather than to declare one of them
supreme.
Jefferson notwithstanding, Congress has sometimes ex-
empted itself from the coverage of laws that govern the
public. In recent years, this practice has encountered in-
creasing criticism. 4 Congress eventually felt compelled to
respond comprehensively to the criticism. The first legisla-
tion enacted by the 104th Congress was the Congressional
Accountability Act, which applies a group of major federal
statutes to Congress and its instrumentalities.5 The Act
3. See generally CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION 1603-
1714 (1961); MAURICE ASHLEY, ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1980).
4. See, e.g., THOMAS W. REED & BRADLEY J. CAMERON, ABOVE THE LAW,
CONGRESSIONAL COVERAGE UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT LAWS (1994); Ilyse J.
Veron, Congress Prepares to Close Legal Loopholes for Itself, CONG. Q. WKLY.,
Sept. 18, 1993, at 2431; Eliza N. Carney, Congress Could Have to Obey Its Laws,
NAT'L J., Sept. 11, 1993, at 2195; Editorial, Make Congress Obey Itself, N.Y. TIMES,
April 12, 1993, at A16.
5. Pub. L. No. 104-1 (1995). See Application of Laws and Administration of
the Hill: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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passed just as this article went to press. Most of the discus-
sion that follows here concerns the landscape that immedi-
ately preceded its passage. For two reasons, however, most
of the analysis remains pertinent. First, I explore the body
of law into which the Act now fits. Second, the Act re-
sponds, successfully I believe, to the constitutional concerns
that I advance below about its initial formulations. I have
added a brief section at the end of the article that summa-
rizes the Act and explains its relationship to what had gone
before.
When Congress applies laws to itself, it sometimes em-
ploys the executive and judicial branches to enforce them,
as it does for ordinary citizens. Applying these techniques
to Congress, however, may threaten interference with Con-
gress' own constitutional responsibilities. Alternatively,
Congress sometimes forms legislative branch enforcement
entities that resemble executive and judicial structures. In
this case, Congress may be revealing the "encroaching char-
acter" of self-defined privileges from the usual strictures of
law enforcement.
I begin by summarizing Congress' current practices in
subjecting its members to some statutes, exempting them
from others, and applying modified versions of a third
group to the members through internal congressional rules.
The complexity of this landscape suggests a return to first
principles. Therefore, I outline the benefits and costs of ap-
plying laws to Congress. Some of the considerations have
constitutional stature; others sound in policy. To guide the
constitutional analysis, I classify congressional activities
into constitutional, quasi-constitutional, and proprietary
functions. I then review existing strictures that bind con-
gressmen 6 as they engage in each of these functions. I con-
clude that Congress may continue to rely on a combination
of internal enforcement processes, ordinary criminal prose-
cutions, and private tort suits to police its constitutional and
quasi-constitutional activities. For proprietary matters,
however, serious constitutional doubts surround Congress'
6. I mean this term in its gender-neutral sense, to include the increasing
number of women in Congress.
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enforcement of statutory obligations through its own
agents. Here I recommend the formation of an independ-
ent regulatory commission in order to bind Congress to law
without granting the executive a weapon for vitiating con-
gressional autonomy.
I. THE CURRENT AMENABILITY OF CONGRESS TO
LAW
An accurate perspective on Congress' practice of ex-
empting itself from statutes requires recognition of the
many instances in which legal norms do apply to members
of Congress.7 There are five categories of such norms.
They are enforced by a diverse and uncoordinated group of
actors: congressional colleagues, federal prosecutors, fed-
eral or state executive agency personnel, private plaintiffs,
and congressional employees.
First, Congress sometimes disciplines its members pur-
suant to its internal codes of ethics, which implement the
constitutional power of the two houses to control their own
proceedings and to punish or expel their members.8 Con-
gress can punish behavior that violates ordinary criminal or
civil statutes, although it is not so limited.9 The ethics codes
contain special strictures that do not apply to anyone
outside of Congress. For example, the Senate's inquiry into
the propriety of intervention by several senators into regu-
latory investigations of savings and loan executive Charles
7. For a comprehensive survey of the application of laws to Congress, includ-
ing the exemptions, see ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 131-48, S. Rep. No. 215,
vol. II & H.R. Rep. No. 413, vol. II, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2: "Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence
of two thirds, expel a Member." See generally CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S
GUIDE TO CONGRESS, PART VIII, QUALIFICATIONS AND CONDUCT (4th ed. 1991).
9. In In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897), the Court said that either house
could punish conduct that it regarded as "inconsistent with the trust and duty of a
member," even if it was "not a statutable offense nor was it committed in his official
character, nor was it committed during the session of Congress, nor at the seat of
government." Id. at 669-70.
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Keating was governed by the Senate's rule against "im-
proper conduct which may reflect upon the Senate."'10
Congress does not have a history of strict enforcement
of its internal rules." Several reasons may account for con-
gressional reluctance to punish miscreant members. Most
important, the powers of exclusion and expulsion threaten
our basic value "that the people should choose whom they
please to govern them.' 2 A vigorous disciplinary process
could easily become a politicized tool to punish unpopular
members or views. Other factors dampening discipline in-
clude: the desire to minimize scandal that flows from loy-
alty to the institution, the need for harmony in a collegial
institution, and the press of other business.' 3 Congress also
encounters a criticism that is common to self-regulation by
lawyers and other professionals-that these systems inher-
ently tend to be overly sympathetic to transgressors and
thereby forfeit their effectiveness.' 4 Hence, it may be
10. S. Res. 338, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(1) (1964); see generally INVESTIGA-
TION OF SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON, S. REP, No. 223, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
11. See generally CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra
note 9; ABNER J. MIKVA & PATI B. SARIS, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, THE FIRST
BRANCH 360-62 (1983).
For the Senate, see RICHARD A. BAKER, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 55-56 (1988)(Senate has expelled fifteen members, four-
teen of them for joining the Confederacy. The other, William Blount, was expelled
in 1797, for conspiring with Great Britain against the interests of the United States).
The Senate has also occasionally subjected its members to varying forms of censure,
most notably Senator Joseph McCarthy.
For the House of Representatives, see HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFI-
CIAL CONDUCT, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF CONDUCT CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES, No. 742, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992)(House has expelled four
members, three of them for aiding the Confederacy, the other for bribery). Others
have been reprimanded.
Raw statistics on disciplinary outcomes do not, however, tell the whole story
since members sometimes resign when faced with charges. For example, Senator
Williams resigned in 1982 to avoid expulsion after a felony conviction; House
Speaker Wright resigned in 1989 while embroiled in disciplinary proceedings.
12. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969), in which the Court,
justifying a narrow construction of Congress' power to exclude members-elect,
quoted this phrase from Hamilton; see infra text accompanying note 68.
13. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK SPECIAL COMMIT-
TEE ON CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 211-15 (1970).
14. See generally ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY (1992).
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neither realistic nor wise to attempt strongly to invigorate
the congressional disciplinary process.
Second, the federal criminal laws apply to congress-
men.15 This fact exposes them to the full powers of investi-
gation and prosecution of the Department of Justice.
Congress has even included language in some criminal stat-
utes that explicitly applies them to its members, for exam-
ple the prohibition on giving or taking bribes.' 6
Prosecutions for crimes such as bribery or receiving illegal
gratuities have succeeded even though they present tricky
problems of avoiding intrusiori on the Speech or Debate
privilege of the members. 7 Still, criminal prosecutions of
congressmen have not been frequent, despite occasional lu-
rid events such as the ABSCAM investigation. 8 This fact
suggests that interbranch jealousies have not led to over-
prosecution of congressmen by the executive.
Third, private plaintiffs have successfully pursued state
law tort claims for damages against members and employ-
ees of Congress for behavior that is related to official busi-
ness but is outside the rather narrow scope of the
constitutional privilege. For example, Hutchinson v.
Proxmire9 was a suit for defamation against a senator for
statements made in a newsletter he issued. Private plain-
15. It might be thought that congressmen derive an immunity from the criminal
law from the Constitution's provision in art. I, § 6 that: "[tihey shall in all Cases,
except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest ......
The Supreme Court held, however, in Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425
(1908), that any criminal charge falls within the clause's exemptions from immunity.
The clause protected congressmen from civil arrest while that practice survived; it
does not protect them from ordinary civil process. Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76
(1934).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988). Congress has, though, exempted both itself and
elected executive officers from some criminal provisions that would be problematic
in application to elected representatives. See 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1988 & Supp.
1993)(prohibiting acting as "agent or attorney" for private parties in certain circum-
stances); 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1988 & Supp. 1993)(prohibiting employees from taking
official government action on any matter in which they have a financial interest).
17. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); United States v. Brew-
ster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
18. See generally ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEP-rION IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT (Gerald M. Caplan ed., 1983); Katherine Goldwasser, After AB-
SCAM: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit Targeting Discretion in
Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75 (1987).
19. 443 U.S. 111 (1979); see also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
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tiffs are probably quite aggressive in pressing such tort
claims, especially when political animus is present.2 °
Fourth, Congress sometimes subjects itself to the civil
enforcement authority of federal or state executive agencies
for statutory provisions that apply to government employ-
ees generally. For example, the Department of Labor con-
siders both workers' compensation claims 21  and
unemployment compensation claims 22 by employees of
Congress. The workers' compensation scheme can result in
a job restoration order in favor of an injured congressional
employee. The unemployment compensation statute is par-
tially administered by state agencies which determine
whether a congressional employee is eligible for an award
and its amount. These statutes appear to operate without
serious interbranch strain.
Fifth, Congress sometimes formally exempts itself from
a statute that binds the public, but then adopts, through in-
ternal rules, a system that may closely resemble the gener-
ally applicable one. I call this "shadow regulation." For
example, although Congress did not at first subject itself to
the employment discrimination statutes, the House of Rep-
resentatives created an Office of Fair Employment Prac-
tices by rule and empowered it to adjudicate complaints by
employees against their offices to enforce the central
prohibitions of those statutes.23 When the Senate subjected
20. The deterrent effect of private tort suits against congressmen would not
extend, however, to suits brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (1988 & Supp. 1992), because these judgments are paid out of the
Treasury. The Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain
torts committed by its employees, a term that appears to cover both members of
Congress and their employees. See id. at § 2671. For discussion of deficiencies in
the Act's deterrent effects, see PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REM-
EDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
21. Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8151 (1988 &
Supp. 1993).
22. Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 8501-8508 (1988).
23. Fair Employment Practices Resolution, H.R. Res. 558, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987)(codified as House Rule 51, H.R. Res. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). It
provides that "personnel actions affecting employment positions in the House of
Representatives shall be made free from discrimination based on race, color, na-
tional origin, religion, sex (including marital or parental status), disability, or age"
and that "interpretations [of the rule] shall reflect the principles of current law."
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itself to similar procedures in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,24
the House chose to remain under its existing scheme.
Both houses employ systems of administrative adjudication
by hearing boards that are similar to each other and to the
procedures that the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission uses to decide complaints against executive agen-
cies.26 The Senate, like the executive branch, is also subject
to federal court review; the House is not.
Shadow regulation risks the omission of some element
that vitally affects those who are subject to the general re-
gime. On the other hand, it allows tailoring a norm to the
nature of Congress. Judging its adequacy would require a
close analysis of particular departures from generally appli-
cable statutory provisions and the justifications for them.
This overview reveals that it would be quite inaccurate
to characterize Congress as holding itself generally "above
the law." Notwithstanding their constitutional privilege,
members of Congress are subject to a complex set of legal
constraints. Although the efficacy of these constraints var-
ies, all are supplemented by the electoral sanction held by
the public. Still, Congress remains exempt from some im-
portant statutes. These fall into two broad categories: laws
regulating the executive branch and laws regulating the
public.
24. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 302, 105 Stat. 1071, tit. III, 1088 (1991). Section 302
of the Act provides:
All personnel actions affecting employees of the Senate shall be made free
from any discrimination based on-
(1) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, within the meaning of
section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16);
(2) age, within the meaning of section 15 of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a); or
(3) handicap or disability, within the meaning of section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791).and sections 102-104 of the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12112-14).
Id. at 302 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1202 (1991)).
25. Section 117(a) of the Act extended the "rights and protections" of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and of the Americans With Disabilities Act to House
employees, subject to the internal enforcement procedures now codified in House
Rule LI. Id. (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 601 (1991)).
26. This scheme is also used to enforce the provisions of the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6.
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The most important statutes regulating internal
processes of the executive branch that Congress has not ap-
plied to itself are the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),27 and the Privacy Act.28 Congress has recently
subjected itself to the provisions of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978 that require the appointment of in-
dependent counsel to investigate and prosecute serious
federal crimes allegedly committed by executive officers.29
I will discuss the constitutional and policy implications of
applying these statutes to Congress.3°
Second, many modern federal statutes impose burden-
some regulation on the public. Those that regulate the
terms and conditions of employment usually do apply to
Congress, at least through shadow regulation. Some, how-
ever, apply only to portions of the legislative branch.31 An-
other group of statutes regulates occupational health and
safety or environmental conditions. All of these statutes re-
quire large expenditures by private and public institutions
for compliance, and each involves a major administrative
apparatus and a complex set of regulations with which af-
fected persons must deal. Many of these statutes are inap-
plicable to Congress simply because they regulate functions
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1988). Under subsection (c), however, the Attorney
General was already authorized to seek appointment of an independent counsel for
anyone if participation by the Department of Justice "may result in a personal, fi-
nancial, or political conflict of interest." This portion of the Act expired in Decem-
ber, 1992, and has since been renewed by Congress. Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat.
732. Congress was already subject to the Act's other principal provisions, which
require public financial disclosure and which restrict outside income and post-em-
ployment lobbying contacts. See generally Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private In-
come: Conflicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of Government Officials,
87 Nw. U. L. REV. 57 (1992); Thomas D. Morgan, Public Financial Disclosure by
Federal Officials: A Functional Approach, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCs 217 (1989).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 35-48.
31. For example, the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 7101-7135 (1988 & Supp. 1993), applies only to the Library of Congress and the
Government Printing Office, and excludes the General Accounting Office; the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. 1992), applies
directly only to congressional units that use the competitive service; the FLSA and
the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988 & Supp. 1992), apply to the House
through shadow regulation, but not to the Senate.
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Congress does not perform, such as mining32 or shipping. 33
Congress is also exempt, though, from the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 34 which governs some pri-
vate workplace functions that Congress does perform.
Thus, Congress' decisions to apply statutes to its own
operations form a complex mosaic. Today, the critical is-
sues have less to do with whether statutes should govern
Congress (in general, they do) but how they should apply.
Most important, who should apply them-congressional or
executive and judicial personnel? To begin addressing.
these issues, I return to first principles, with an inquiry
about why we subject Congress to its laws.
II. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF APPLYING, LAWS TO
CONGRESS
Why should statutes apply to Congress? What advan-
tages and disadvantages will ensue? A number of principles
bear on these questions. First, the advantages:
1. Reducing the Burdens of Legislation. The move-
ment to apply statutes to Congress has deep roots in repub-
lican theory. Aristotle, viewing ancient Athens' direct
democracy, stressed that the fairness of legislation was pro-
moted by the fact that as soon as a citizen finished serving
as a legislator on a given day, he returned to the mass of
citizens who were subject to the laws.35 What he did to
others, he did to himself. Locke, viewing an emerging rep-
resentative republic at the threshold of the modern era,
echoed Aristotle. A legislator would be impelled to con-
sider the interests of his constituents because he would bear
the same burdens he placed on them when he resumed his
original status as an ordinary citizen.36
32. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-878 (1988 & Supp.
1992).
33. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1988).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1988).
35. ARISTOTLE, THE POLrrIcs OF ARISTOTLE 42 (Ernest Barker ed., 1946)(ro-
tation of citizens in office means that "some rule, and others are ruled, in turn").
36. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 379 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967)(2d ed. 1698)(Locke argues that arbitrary
treatment of property "is not much to be fear'd in Governments where the Legisla-
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At the time of our founding, Madison emphasized the
need to preserve common interests among governors and
governed:
I will add, as a... circumstance in the situation of the
House of Representatives, restraining them from op-
pressive measures, that they can make no law which will
not have its full operation on themselves and their
friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This
has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by
which human policy can connect the rulers and the peo-
ple together. It creates between them that communion
of interests and sympathy of sentiments . . .without
which every government degenerates into tyranny.37
Thus, the views of Madison and Jefferson reflected ancient
tradition.
These values, grounded in common sense perceptions
about human nature, have great force in our own polity.
The Constitution embodies them in its assignment of the
power to initiate taxation to the House of Representatives,
the body that is most frequently elected by the people.38
Yet modern constitutional law imposes few constraints on
the power of Congress to burden American citizens, as long
as the protections of the Bill of Rights are honored. The
limits that are implicit in enumerated powers have effec-
tively disappeared since the New Deal left Congress a leg-
acy of plenary power under the Commerce Clause.39
Similarly, protection of federalist values is mostly left to the
representation of state and local interests in the structure of
Congress.4 0 With external legal constraints on Congress so
weak, internal incentives that have direct and powerful ef-
fects on the members' behavior become especially impor-
tant. In an era of professional politicians who often spend
rive consists, wholly or in part, in Assemblies which are variable, whose Members
upon the Dissolution of the Assembly, are Subjects under the common Laws of their
Country, equally with the rest").
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 385 (James Madison)(Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton)(Benjamin F. Wright
ed., 1961).
39. See generally Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 663 (1946).
40. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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decades in Congress and who are quite difficult to defeat,
we cannot expect that lawmaking will be much constrained
by a member's eventual return to the citizenry.41
Perhaps, then, we should recognize a constitutional
principle that Congress must subject itself to the laws it en-
acts. Courts could entertain challenges by citizens to stat-
utes that do not apply to Congress. The grounds of
objection could be either the equal protection principle or a
notion of "due process of lawmaking. ' 42 The ultimate value
lying behind such formulae is the rule of law, which informs
many particular constitutional doctrines. Presumably, Con-
gress would be entitled to defend an exemption by showing
that application of the law to it or to its members would be
incompatible with its unique institutional nature and func-
tions. (A fervid Antifederalist might even deny the validity
of any such defense.) For example, it appears that congres-
sional agencies, protected by an exemption from OSHA's
requirements for safe working conditions, lag behind pri-
vate industry in ways that applying OSHA would correct.43
Courts could entertain claims that the exemption should be
invalidated unless Congress could demonstrate that the op-
erations of the Government Printing Office or the House
Folding Room are somehow distinct from their private
analogues.44
Before we erect new constitutional rights and duties,
however, we need to examine, as I do below, whether vol-
untary congressional acceptance of a responsibility to com-
ply with statutes poses special difficulties. Congress has
recently shown a willingness to apply its laws to its own op-
erations; new constitutional obligations should be created
41. See generally GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS
AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, 72-91 (1993); see also JAMES
T. CURRIE, THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1 (1988).
42. For an able review of ways that constitutions could constrain lawmaking
processes, see Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEBR. L. REV. 197
(1976).
43. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH: UNEVEN PROTECTIONS PROVIDED TO CONGRESSIONAL EMPLOYEES,
GAO/HRD-93-1 (1992).
44. There would be obvious, and perhaps insurmountable, problems with es-
tablishing the standing of a private plaintiff for such litigation, however. See United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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only when a need for them has been demonstrated. At
present, the electoral pressure that our system relies on as
the primal control on Congress seems to be working
adequately.
2. Informing Congress About Its Laws. The duty to
comply with a law fully informs a person about its opera-
tion. Although members of Congress attempt to predict
how their statutes will operate, no law is the same in execu-
tion as it was in contemplation. The disparity can be con-
siderable, partly because words are imperfect tools to
communicate intention, and partly because most statutes
undergo considerable interpretation and supplementation
by the executive agencies before they apply to the public. 45
Because the statutes that regulate public health and safety,
like icebergs, contain most of their bulk below the surface
of their text, it may be that the only way Congress can know
them fully is to feel their force directly.
Congress makes a serious effort to oversee execution,
but its success is never complete. Constituent complaints or
testimony in oversight hearings are no substitute for the
personal knowledge of a law's impact that comes from an
effort to comply with it. If Congress must obey a law rather
than watch others do so, the chances for an "information
gap" decline radically.
3. Maintaining Public Confidence. Nothing is more
important to the actual health and legitimacy of a demo-
cratic government than the public's confidence in it. The
absence of that confidence, moreover, poses dangers more
concrete than editorial handwringing. A people that is an-
gry with its legislators for being "above the law" may pun-
ish them with constitutionally imposed restrictions that are
undesirable in themselves, or at least unnecessary to the ex-
tent that Congress is willing to take curative action itself.
For example, the movement for congressional term limita-
tions is designed to replace unresponsive professional legis-
lators with citizen-legislators in the classic republican
,. 45., Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 207 (1984).
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mold.46 Yet such limits necessarily forfeit vast amounts of
expertise and dedication by removing the good legislators
along with the bad. Reforms that target the specific sources
of public discontent can avoid incurring these collateral
costs.
4. Avoiding Executive or Judicial Overreaching. In our
system of separated and checked powers, a deficiency in
one of the branches may impel the others to attempt cor-
rectives, including unwise ones. The judiciary, wishing to
redress a congressman's misbehavior that would be subject
to statutory damages but for an exemption, may imply a
constitutional cause of action to fill the gap. Thus, in Davis
v. Passman, the Supreme Court created a constitutional
cause of action for a congressional employee who alleged
that her dismissal was due to gender discrimination-at the
time, Congress was exempt from the statute banning such
discrimination in other employment. Similarly, the execu-
tive, frustrated by Congress' unwillingness to' follow civil
norms that it imposes on others, may press to expand crimi-
nal norms from which Congress is not exempt. If Congress
is seen to make considered and justifiable judgments about
its own amenability to law, these pressures may diminish.
5. Promoting Parity in Public Service Obligations. Ex-
ecutive officers are subject to a number of constraints on
their conduct that do not apply to ordinary citizens. Exam-
ples include exposure to special prosecutors, prohibitions
on conflicts of interest, and requirements to open their
processes and records to public scrutiny. To the extent that
members of Congress are not subject to these constraints,
the burdens of public service may seem to be unequally
shared. When Congress applies burdensome openness re-
quirements or special prosecutorial processes to its chief in-
stitutional rival but not to itself, inferences of motives to
shackle the executive, rather than to benefit the public, are
46. See generally WILL, supra note 41; Nelson W. Polsby, Some Arguments
Against Congressional Term Limitations, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (1993);
Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the
Constitutionality of State Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341
(1991).
47. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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easy to draw and may sometimes be warranted. The results
are resentment and diminished moral imperative to comply.
In a democracy, there is value in treating public servants
alike, regardless of their station or the branch in which they
serve, except where special functional needs counsel
otherwise.48
The foregoing advantages to applying laws to Congress
are powerful ones. As with all proposals for legal change,
however, there are potential disadvantages:
1. Impeding Performance of Constitutional Functions.
At a minimum, compliance with law always entails the ex-
penditure of time, effort, and money by someone, with op-
portunity cost to the preferred uses of those resources.
Members of Congress are already very busy performing
their public duties. If the scarce resource of their time is
channeled into law compliance, other activities must give
way. The most serious danger is that the core constitutional
functions of Congress, such as consideration of legislation,
will be impeded. Even if this does not occur, added disin-
centives to service in Congress are not a minor matter.
2. Deterring Desired Conduct. The task of legislating
is unique in many ways, as the Constitution recognizes by
extending special privileges from outside harassment to
congressmen but not to other officers of the government.
Insofar as a major purpose-or at least a necessary effect-
of extending laws to Congress is to modify the members'
behavior, the danger arises that some of the modifications
will prove undesirable. At worst, the possibility is that
Congress could lose some of the independence and fearless-
ness that its privileges are designed to protect.
Because congressmen are constantly exposed to the
judgment of the electorate, they are uniquely sensitive to
disclosure as a sanction. To the extent that anticipation of
negative publicity deters congressional misconduct, the ad-
dition of sanctions designed to penalize private misconduct
may prove superfluous at best. And since the most techni-
cal violation of law provides a political opponent grist for
48. Cynthia Farina, Keeping Faith: Government Ethics & Government Ethics
Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 287 (1993).
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scandal, there is a significant potential that an unhealthy
overcautiousness could develop due to overdeterrence.
3. Encouraging Judicial or Executive Encroachment.
Federal statutes are enforced either by the courts or by the
executive. In our government, the branches are expected to
be in constant competition for power, and the checks in the
system are designed to balance that competition. If Con-
gress subjects itself to enforcement activities of the other
branches, an opportunity arises for one or both of them to
harass members of Congress in retribution for their unre-
lated conduct of office. I argued above that legal exemp-
tions for Congress can lead to overcompensation by the
other branches. Thus, either too little or too much applica-
tion of statutes to Congress can induce improper behavior
by one or both of the other branches.
4. Creating Legal Misfits. Statutes that are designed
and administered with general public compliance in mind
may fit the unique institution of Congress badly. Neither
executive regulations nor judicial interpretations that im-
plement statutes are tailored to congressional characteris-
tics. To the extent that a law operates in an unusual fashion
when applied to Congress, much of the purpose of subject-
ing Congress to it disappears and the chance of disrupting
legislative operations increases.
Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of ap-
plying laws to Congress has demonstrated that the stakes
are high. To isolate ways that we may be able to capture
most of the former while minimizing most of the latter, I
begin by attempting a taxonomy of congressional functions.
III. A HIERARCHY OF CONGRESSIONAL
FUNCTIONS
The functions that Congress performs can be grouped
into three broad categories that aid analysis of how legal
constraints should apply. These categories begin with the
powers that the Constitution explicitly assigns Congress,
and move toward activities for which Congress appears to
differ little from other public and private institutions of its
size. My general conclusion will be that congressional func-
tions nearest the constitutional core must be policed by
[Vol. 48:105120
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Congress itself, and that activities far from that core may or
must be policed by the executive.
1. Constitutional Functions. The Constitution assigns
Congress a number of responsibilities whose actual per-
formance surely must be by the members themselves and
no one else. First and foremost is the vesting in Congress,
by the first sentence of article I, of "[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted." The other important constitutional pow-
ers of Congress are: to impeach executive and judicial of-
ficers;49 to determine the elections and qualifications of its
own members and to punish or expel them for miscon-
duct;50 to propose constitutional amendments; 51 and, for the
Senate, to advise and consent to treaties and executive
nominations.52
All of these functions are doubtless protected by the
Speech or Debate privilege, which covers matters that are
an integral part of the deliberative . . .processes by
which Members participate in committee and House
proceedings with respect to the consideration and pas-
sage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect
to other matters which the Constitution places within
the jurisdiction of either House.53
The Supreme Court's shorthand term for the activities pro-
tected by the privilege is "legislative acts." Not only the
members themselves, but also their aides, can claim the
privilege "insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a
protected legislative act if performed by the Member
himself. 5 4
2. Quasi-Constitutional Functions. Intimately related
in practice to Congress' constitutional functions are two
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
51. U.S. CONST. art. V.
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
53. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). The Court also often says
that the privilege covers " 'things generally done in a session of the House by one of
its members in relation to the business before it.'" Id. at 617 (quoting Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880)); see generally Note, Speech or Debate Immu-
nity: Preserving Legislative Independence While Cutting Costs of Congressional Im-
munity, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 589 (1985).
- 54. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 618; see generally Note, The Speech or Debate Clause
Protection of Congressional Aides, 91 YALE L.J. 961 (1982).
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kinds of investigating activity that are only partially covered
by the Speech or Debate privilege. Congress investigates
conditions in society and often publicizes the results of its
inquiries. Congress also oversees the executive and judicial
branches, and may publicize the results of these inquiries.
Some of these investigations are formally authorized hear-
ings by committees and subcommittees." Others, such as
inquiries responding to constituents' requests for aid with
the executive, are informal efforts by individual members
and their staffs.
This is a broad range of activity, much of which only
indirectly supports constitutional functions such as legislat-
ing or reviewing treaties. The Supreme Court has extended
the constitutional privilege only to the relatively formal
steps by which' Congress obtains information in aid of its
constitutional functions, and not to the informal satellite ac-
tivities. Protected activities include gathering information
for a hearing, performing the hearing, and printing a report
for use within Congress. Activities not protected include
issuing a newsletter to constituents, representing them
before executive agencies, or publicizing national problems
beyond Congress.56
Perhaps the reason for the Court's evident caution in
defining the scope of the privilege was captured by Jeffer-
son's perception of the "encroaching character" of privi-
leges. A history of congressional abuse of the investigative
function, especially in the loyalty investigations of this cen-
tury, may also explain the Court's approach. 7 Moreover,
many quasi-constitutional functions are delegated to staff
personnel, who are numerous and who lack direct electoral
responsibility.5 8
55. See generally JOHN C. GRABOW, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LAW
AND PRACTICE (1988); JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE, A STUDY OF
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (1976).
56. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
57. See ROBERT K. CARR, Constitutional and Statutory Limitations on Congres-
sional Investigations, in 3 THE FIRST BRANCH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (Joel
Silbey ed., 1991).
58. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL
STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1980).
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3. Proprietary Functions. As an institution, Congress
must perform a number of housekeeping functions that are
like those of a federal or state agency or a private business.
The House and Senate have a number of support agencies:
the Library of Congress, the Government Printing Office,
the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting
Office, the Architect of the Capitol, the Botanic Garden,
and the Office of Technology Assessment. Altogether,
Congress has about 40,000 employees.5 9 Congress differs
little from any other organization its size when it serves
food, issues parking permits, buys office supplies, or prints
its papers. The Capitol Police may be distinguished by their
courtesy, the cafeterias by their bean soup, but constitu-
tional distinctions from similar activities at the Texas State
Capitol or the Boeing factory would be difficult to draw.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never ex-
tended the constitutional privilege to these proprietary ac-
tivities. There are some difficulties that I will discuss,
however, in distinguishing them from Congress' constitu-
tional functions in cases involving employment, where the
constitutional privilege is sometimes pertinent.
Each of these three categories needs full analysis of
congressional and executive roles in the application of legal
norms. I now turn to that task.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
Congress certainly bears the principal responsibility for
punishing its members' misconduct in the performance of
their constitutional functions. That responsibility may well
be almost entirely exclusive of the other two branches. It is
clear that the Speech or Debate privilege prevents the exec-
utive from prosecuting congressmen for these activities, or
even from offering evidence about them at a trial for other
crimes. Less clear is whether the Supreme Court will treat
most aspects of the congressional disciplinary process as
political questions and deny judicial review of them.
59. JoINT COMM. ON THE ORG. OF CONG., 103 D CONG., 1ST SESS., ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE CONGRESS, at 88 (1993).
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Describing the purpose of the Speech or Debate privi-
lege, the Supreme Court often says:
The legislative privilege, protecting against possible
prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction
by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of the "prac-
tical security" for ensuring the independence of the
legislature.'
The Court's reference to "practical security" is a quote
from Madison's argument in The Federalist that each
branch needs guarantees "against the invasion of the
others."' 61 The Court's emphasis on the privilege's purpose
to safeguard the autonomy of Congress suggests strongly
that, although the range of "legislative acts" covered is rela-
tively narrow, it will include all the constitutional functions
of Congress.
The Court has consistently refused to allow the execu-
tive to offer proof of a congressman's legislative acts as part
of a prosecution for crime. For example, in bribery prose-
cutions convictions must rest on proof that a member prom-
ised legislative action in return for a bribe, without any
reference to whether the promise was performed.62 Thus,
where it can, the Court accommodates criminal law to the
privilege by defining the elements of a crime to steer clear
of any need for proof of legislative acts.63
Although the executive may not enter the privileged
realm, the courts could decide to extend judicial review to
Congress' performance of its power to punish and expel
members. Intrusion on the privilege would be lessened, be-
cause, instead of allowing hostile prosecutors to haul con-
gressmen into the criminal courts, the judiciary would only
be assuring that Congress' own decision to punish a mem-
60. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966).
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 343 (James Madison)(Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961).
62. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169 (1966).
63. In McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 1807 (1991), the Court interpreted
the federal extortion statute to require an explicit promise by a legislator to perform
an official act in return for a contribution before there could be a conviction. The
Court's ruling both helped to distinguish ordinary campaign contributions from ex-
tortion and specified elements of crime that could be proved without invading the
privilege.
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ber is within constitutional limits. The cases have contained
conflicting implications about judicial review.
In United States v. Brewster, the Court explained why
judicial review might be needed.64 A senator convicted of
bribery argued for a very broad interpretation of the immu-
nity, claiming that Congress should be left to police matters
having any relationship to the legislative process. The
Court noted that if Congress took on such a responsibility,
the effect might be to impair the independence of individual
members:
The process of disciplining a Member in the Con-
gress is not without countervailing risks of abuse since it
is not surrounded with the panoply of protective shields
that are present in a criminal case. An accused Member
is judged by no specifically articulated standards and is
at the mercy of an almost unbridled discretion of the
charging body that functions at once as accuser, prose-
cutor, judge, and jury from whose decision there is no
established right of review. In short, a Member would
be compelled to defend in what would be comparable
to a criminal prosecution without, the safeguards pro-
vided by the Constitution. Moreover, it would be some-
what naive to assume that the triers would be wholly
objective and free from considerations of party and
politics and the passions of the moment. Strong argu-
ments can be made that trials conducted in a Congress
with an entrenched majority from one political party
could result in far greater harassment than a conven-
tional criminal trial with the wide range of procedural
protections for the accused, including indictment by
grand jury, trial by jury under strict standards of proof
with fixed rules of evidence, and extensive appellate
review.
These reflections may reveal why the Court was willing
to review some aspects of the congressional disciplinary
process in Powell v. McCormack.65 The House of Repre-
sentatives, finding Adam Clayton Powell guilty of some fi-
nancial irregularities in a preceding Congress, excluded him
64. 408 U.S. at 519-20.
65. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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at the beginning of a session.66 Charges of political and ra-
cial bias on the part of the House swirled around the affair.
The Court held that the phrase in article I, § 5, author-
izing each house to "be the judge of the Qualifications of its
own Members," was not a "textual commitment" of all is-
sues surrounding an exclusion to Congress without judicial
review. Reaching the merits, the Court held that Congress
could exclude a member only for failing to meet the Consti-
tution's "standing qualifications" of age, citizenship, and
residency in article I. There was no allegation that Powell
failed to meet these qualifications.
To justify its narrow construction of the exclusion
power, the Court argued that a
fundamental principle of our representative democracy
is, in Hamilton's words, "that the people should choose
whom they please to govern them." 2 Elliott's Debates
257. As Madison pointed out at the Convention, this
principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the
people can select as by limiting the franchise itself.67
This emphasis on the people's right to choose their repre-
sentatives suggests that the Court would review expulsions
from Congress, for which the Constitution requires a two-
thirds majority vote, as well as exclusions.68 Of course, the
Powell Court was not presented with that question. The
Court did remark, however, that Congress had often
seemed uncertain of its power to expel for conduct occur-
ring in prior congresses, implying that departure from this
practice might warrant review.
66. For a general discussion of the case, see Robert Eckhardt, The Adam Clay-
ton Powell Case, 45 TEX. L. REV. 1205 (1967).
67. 395 U.S. at 547.
68. The Court also quoted James Wilson's understanding of the reason for the
Speech or Debate privilege, a formulation suggesting that it protects the legislator
personally against everyone, including colleagues:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to dis-
charge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably neces-
sary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should
be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.
395 U.S. at 503 (citing 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (Robert McCloskey ed.,
1967)).
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On the other hand, the Court noted that the Conven-
tion had altered a proposal to allow expulsion by majority
vote to the two-thirds concurrence that appears in the Con-
stitution. Perhaps, then, the framers were constructing a
system that would confine exclusion by majority vote to a
few, stated grounds that a court could review, but would
allow expulsion by two-thirds vote at the unreviewable dis-
cretion of the House. Since political abuse of the discipli-
nary process could still occur, however, such a system
would have to rest on two judgments. The first would be
that a supermajority requirement is an adequate practical
control on political abuse.69 The second would be that since
expulsion is ordinarily for conduct during a session, Con-
gress has a greater interest in controlling its own proceed-
ings than it has in exclusion cases, even if voter choice may
be frustrated.
The Court has since held that an individual congress-
man's waiver of the privilege must be "explicit and une-
quivocal" to be effective.70 The Court also suggested that
Congress could not impose waivers on its members, be-
cause "the privilege secured.., is not so much the privilege
of the house as an organized body, as of each member com-
posing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the
declared will of the house. 71 It is important, however, to
distinguish congressional attempts to waive the rights of
members to defend themselves against the executive or the
judiciary from congressional rules that enforce the internal
disciplinary process. Although, as Powell reveals, congres-
sional discipline has the potential to interfere with the elec-
torate's right to choose their representatives, the interest of
Congress in effective self-policing is substantial, especially
in the realm of privilege where no other branch may enter.
Hence, the two houses can force their members to provide
evidence for disciplinary proceedings even when the mater-
69. See generally Dorian Bowman & Judith F. Bowman, Article I, Section 5:
Congress' Power to Expel-An Exercise in Self-Restraint, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1071 (1978).
70. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979).
71. Id. at 493 (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808)).
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ials would be privileged from forced disclosure to the other
branches.72
The Court's recent decision in Nixon v. United States73
implies that all aspects of the congressional disciplinary
process except for exclusion are unreviewable political
questions. Nixon, a federal judge who had been impeached
and removed following a criminal conviction, objected to
the Senate's practice of delegating the initial stages of its
impeachment trial process to a committee.74 The Court
held that the Constitution's provision that the Senate "shall
have sole Power to try all Impeachments" was a textual
commitment to the Senate of the power to decide how to
try impeachments. Concurring, Justice White emphasized
the possibility of abuse of such unreviewable power, but
found no cause for intervention in the case at hand.
The Court is certainly aware that impeachment, like in-
ternal congressional discipline, can be arbitrary-the im-
peachments of Justice Chase and of President Johnson were
notoriously so?5 Perhaps the sweep of the Nixon opinion is
explained by the institutional considerations that often play
so large a role in political question cases. The Court re-
marked that judicial review of impeachments could lead to
a disastrous lack of finality if a President were impeached.
When Congress expels a member, no such national ca-
lamity impends; perhaps Nixon will be confined to the im-
peachment context. 6 It may even be, as some have
suggested, that the houses can delegate the initial stages of
72. See Senate Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C.
1994)(enforcing committee subpoena for Senator's diaries).
73. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
74. See generally Napoleon B. Williams, Jr., The Historical and Consfitutional
Bases for the Senate's Power to Use Masters or Committees to Receive Evidence in
Impeachment Trials, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 512 (1975). For a critique of this process, see
Note, Committee Impeachment Trials: The Best Solution?, 80 GEo. L.J. 163 (1991).
75. Indeed, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the author of Nixon, has written a
history of the Chase and Johnson impeachments. WILLIAM REHNQUIST, GRAND IN-
QUESTS (1992). The Chief Justice concludes that, if successful, the impeachments
would have threatened the independence of the judiciary and the executive.
76. The courts could, however, enforce subpoenas from the congressional eth-
ics committees against members, see supra note 72, without reviewing the merits of
the pending charges, if they confined themselves to questions of constitutional privi-
leges against providing the information (such as the privilege against self-
incrimination).
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disciplinary inquiries to bodies composed partly or entirely
of outsiders, as long as the whole house makes the final dis-
position.77 Nixon could be distinguished, however, by the
fact that the impeachment process remains entirely "in-
house."
The discussion so far reveals that criminal law and con-
gressional self-discipline can play complementary roles in
regulating the behavior of congressmen. Congress must re-
tain responsibility for its members' performance of consti-
tutional functions, all of which are immune from
prosecution. Conduct related to the legislative process but
not within the privilege, such as acceptance of bribes, can
be punished by both criminal and congressional processes.
As the Brewster Court argued, there is reason to prefer
criminal processes for misconduct outside the privilege, at
least in the first instance. The safeguards normal to crimi-
nal trials replace a discretionary process that is vulnerable
to political influence. Certainly, congressional discipline
could be too harsh when applied to an unpopular member.
Still, Congress does not have a record of frequent discipli-
nary proceedings against unpopular members. Everyone
knows how destructive such a practice could rapidly be-
come, and how quickly the wheel of politics could turn to-
day's prosecutor into tomorrow's defendant.
Indeed, the infrequency of congressional disciplinary
action suggests that the process is too lenient in application
to anyone not already convicted of a serious felony or
grossly out of favor with the congressional establishment.
Certainly the reputation of self-disciplinary processes in the
professions is one of laxity due to collegial sympathies. If
Congress usually underprosecutes the sins of its members,
the presence of executive prosecutors who do not share that
tendency is needed to deter misconduct.
There is, however, a possibility that the executive will
overprosecute congressmen as part of the constant competi-
tion for power that is built into the heart of our system of
.77. See Ethics Process: Hearing Before the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-25 (1993)(testimony of Hon. Louis Stokes, Hon.
James Hansen, and a Panel of Academic Experts).
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separation of powers.7 To date, executive prosecutors have
not produced a record of harassment of Congress around
the boundaries of the constitutional privilege. Numerous
checks and balances exist to deter executive overprosecu-
tion. Agents of the Department of Justice know that if they
overreach in investigating or prosecuting members and staff
of Congress, the legislature has ample means of revenge.
These include statutory restrictions on investigative and
prosecutorial authority, outright exemption of congressmen
or staff from criminal statutes, funding cuts for the Depart-
ment, refusal to confirm nominees to its principal positions,
and, ultimately, impeachment of its officers. Consequently,
underenforcement of the criminal law against Congress, not
overenforcement, seems more likely to have been the
norm.
This analysis suggests a justification for extending stat-
utory authority to appoint independent counsel to cases in-
volving congressmen.79 Tru6, the direct conflicts of interest
that hamper executive self-investigation are absent.80 But
several of the advantages of applying laws to Congress
would be present. First, if congressmen can subject execu-
tive officers to special prosecutors only at the cost of expos-
ing themselves to the same perils, it is less likely that these
burdens will be placed on anyone. Second, full apprecia-
tion for the operation of this statute may be possible only
for those who fear its impact, even though there is no large
body of federal regulations to be mastered (as there would
be for statutes regulating businesses). Third, public confi-
dence might well increase if Congress were subject to pros-
ecutors that it could not hope to intimidate. Fourth, there
would be greater parity of public service obligations. The
other advantage, avoiding temptations on the part of the
other branches to overcompensate, seems not to apply
78. The classic discussion of this competition is in THE FEDERALIST No. 51
(James Madison).
79. The provisions in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 for appointing in-
dependent counsel to investigate and prosecute senior executive officials lapsed in
1992. 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (1988). The renewal statute, enacted in 1994, extends
its authorities to congressmen. Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732.
80. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Harold H. Bruff, Independent
Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539 (1988).
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here, however. It is not likely that the judiciary relishes
prosecutions of congressmen any more than does the
executive.
On the other hand, the disadvantages that usually at-
tend applying laws to Congress seem substantial regarding
the independent counsel statute. Although the Speech or
Debate privilege should sufficiently protect the perform-
ance of constitutional functions, the boundaries of the privi-
lege are murky enough to allow some attempted incursions.
Overdeterrence is also a troubling possibility, as indeed it is
for the executive branch. And a central fear that underlies
the privilege, that of prosecution by an "unfriendly execu-
tive," might be more realistic concerning a prosecutor who
is substantially independent of all three branches than it is
for the Department of Justice, which depends on Congress
in many ways. There does not seem to be much of a prob-
lem of legal misfits, though, since most criminal statutes ap-
ply in the same ways to congressional and executive
personnel, and Congress has already made special excep-
tions for itself in those that do not.
I think these arguments are roughly in equipoise. If so,
Congress could reasonably decline to extend the independ-
ent counsel provisions to itself. If Congress opts for self-
application, though, the advantages of doing so should help
to support the constitutionality of shifting prosecutorial
power away from its usual locus in the executive.
The application of criminal statutes to Congress has
entailed adaptations to avoid the Speech or Debate privi-
lege. Similarly, the application of civil statutes to Congress
needs to steer clear of interference with constitutional func-
tions. It seems likely that most civil statutes will affect the
proprietary activities of Congress. Even where this is the
case, constitutional implications arise if the net burden of
compliance on the members themselves becomes sufficient
to jeopardize their performance of constitutional functions.
Congress' scarcest resource is the time of its members. Ac-
cordingly, Congress needs to consider the incremental dis-
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traction that flows from each statute that it promises to
obey.8 '
The civil statutes that most implicate Congress' consti-
tutional functions are those that regulate government pro-
cess directly. Applying these statutes to Congress could
create many legal misfits because they are designed to regu-
late the hierarchically organized executive branch as it ad-
ministers existing statutes, instead of the collegial
legislature as it considers enacting new statutes and over-
sees the executive. Some of these misfits may raise consti-
tutional concerns, as follows.
Two specific kinds of interference with Congress can
be anticipated. First, open government laws such as FOIA,
the Government in the Sunshine Act, 82 and the Federal Ad-
visory Committee Act (FACA) 83 may reveal parts of the
congressional process that need to be shielded for effective
performance. 84 Since Congress is already quite an open in-
stitution under its own rules, the incremental effect of these
statutes may be mostly in sensitive areas.85
The most serious difficulty with adapting the open gov-
ernment statutes to Congress concerns the opportunity to
deliberate in secret. The executive has a constitutionally
based deliberative privilege, which it sometimes waives.86
FOIA contains an "executive privilege" exemption to pro-
81. Congress also needs to structure its compliance mechanisms in ways that
confine their drain on the members' time.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988). The Act is the federal open meetings statute. It
applies to multi-member agencies only.
83. 5 U.S.C. app. 1 (1988). The Act opens meetings between private advisory
groups and federal agencies to the public, and requires "balanced" membership on
the groups.
84. See James T. O'Reilly, Applying Federal Open Government Laws to Con-
gress: An Explorative Analysis and Proposal, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (1994).
85. Both FOIA and the Sunshine Act contain exemptions protecting national
security secrets, law enforcement matters, and information affecting the privacy of
individuals. Perhaps these exemptions are already sufficient to preserve the efficacy
of congressional legislation and oversight for defense, foreign policy, and law en-
forcement functions, and the confidentiality of advice and consent to controversial
nominations. If not, Congress should consider appropriate modifications.
86. The Supreme Court recognized a qualified constitutional privilege for the
executive in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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tect such material.87 The Sunshine Act does not, since its
purpose is to open policy debate in collegial agencies. To
avoid executive privilege issues, courts have twice inter-
preted FACA not to apply to presidential functions.88
Congress has never established a deliberative privilege
in court.89 Judicial subpoenas for congressional papers have
usually been honored, amid representations that compli-
ance is voluntary. 90 Because policy debate is the lifeblood
of Congress, it ordinarily occurs in public. Needs to shield
it arise in relatively limited contexts, such as the advice of
aides to members concerning policy formulation. Still, the
fact that congressional secrecy needs are more limited than
those of the executive does not mean that they fall short of
constitutional significance. The derivative constitutional
immunity that the aides enjoy recognizes the importance of
their work to the constitutional functions of congressmen.
These statutes would need to be modified before they
are applied to Congress. Some of the likely changes would
illustrate the general benefits of applying law to Congress.
FOIA, in particular, is a strict statute that imposes consider-
able compliance costs and burdens on federal agencies, and
that is enforced by a readily available judicial action in
which the court is instructed not to defer to the agency's
87. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132
(1975). In addition, FOIA does not apply at all to "the President's immediate per-
sonal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist
the President." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 15 (1974); see also
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
88. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989)(American Bar
Ass'n advice on prospective judicial nominees); Association of Am. Physicians &
Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993)(Health Care Task Force, chaired
by Hillary R. Clinton).
89. Such a privilege might flow from art. I, § 5, cl.3, which provides: "Each
House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy .... " See
generally David Kaye, Congressional Papers, Judicial Subpoenas, and the Constitu-
tion, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 523 (1977); Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate,
Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973);
see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 840 (1833).
90. David Kaye, Congressional Papers and Judicial Subpoenas, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 57 (1975).
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reasons for withholding documents. 91 If Congress is not
prepared to tolerate these features of the Act, it-must an-
swer a serious parity objection before it continues to im-
pose them on the executive. The congressional response is
likely to be that executive agencies apply the law directly to
the public, so that information about their activities is more
needed to prevent abuses than is information about the.
more remote legislature.92 Yet the intrinsic importance of
legislation, and of information about its generation, is
surely at least as great as that of execution of the law.
The second kind of interference with Congress that
may result from statutes regulating government consists of
hampering the exercise of constitutional functions by apply-
ing burdensome process requirements. The best example is
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 93 which re-
quires the creation of detailed environmental impact state-
ments (EIS) for "proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the . . environ-
ment. '' 94 The requirement that environmental impact state-
ments accompany proposals for legislation has always been
ignored within Congress because it is neither desirable nor
feasible to delay major legislation, including yearly appro-
priations, while awaiting the compilation of an EIS.95
A serious effort to enforce this provision could pro-
duce sufficient delays to raise the question whether any-
one-Congress included-should be able so to shackle the
91. See generally Glen 0. Robinson, Access to Government Information: The
American Experience, 14 FED. L REV. 35 (1983); Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of
Information Act Has No Clothes, REG., March/April 1982, at 14.
92. Jay R. Shampansky et al., Congress' Exemption From Selected Major Legis-
lation: A Legal Analysis, CRS Rept. No. 92-294 A, at 2 (March 19, 1992).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988 & Supp. 1992).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988).
95. In Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979), the Court held that NEPA
does not require agencies to file environmental impact statements with their appro-
priation requests to the Office of Management and Budget, from whence they go to
Congress. In Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994), the Court of Appeals overturned a
holding that an EIS had to accompany the submission of the North American Free
Trade Agreement to Congress, on grounds that there was no final agency action to
review.
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legislative process. 96 Here the problem is partly cumula-
tive. Congress instructs agencies to consider the effects of
their actions not only on the environment but on small busi-
ness97 and other interests. If all these mandatory analytic
requirements were applied to proposals for legislation, the
total amount of drag could be considerable. The compen-
sating advantages would be the provision of full informa-
tion to Congress about the impact of these requirements
and parity of burdens in public service. The parity argu-
ment would be weakened, however, by the fact that legisla-
tion, unlike execution, is not intrinsically limited to the
rational implementation of previously stated goals.98
Although federal employment statutes relate mostly to
the proprietary functions of Congress, they implicate its
constitutional functions in application to the hiring and fir-
ing of principal staff personnel. The Supreme Court has
been of two minds regarding the status of aides. In Gravel
v. United States,99 the Court granted derivative immunity to
an aide for functions which would have been protected if
performed by the member personally, for example, prepa-
ration for committee hearings. The Court emphasized "that
the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the Mem-
bers' performance that they must be treated as the latter's
alter egos" lest the purposes of the immunity be frus-
trated.100 Yet, in Davis v. Passman,'0 the Court recognized
a constitutional cause of action for gender discrimination by
an aide against a congressman, rejecting a plea by three dis-
senting Justices that application of ordinary strictures
against discrimination ignored "the imperative need for loy-
alty, confidentiality, and political compatibility ... to the
individual Member.' 0 2
96. Similarly, applying the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988 & Supp. 1993), to
Congress could grievously hamper the quasi-constitutional functions of constituent
service because the Act closely controls the disposition within the bureaucracy of
files concerning individuals. See O'Reilly, supra note 84.
97. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
98. See Bruff, supra note 45.
99. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
100. Id. at 616-17.
101. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
102. Id. at 249.
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Considered together, Gravel and Davis suggest that
aides are constitutional alter egos in only a limited sense.
Their actions are protected against the outside assaults that
the Speech or Debate immunity was designed to prevent,
but that does not leave a congressman wholly free to
choose them. Surely a member may require political com-
patibility; but, he or she may not use race or gender as a
proxy for compatibility. In applying the federal employ-
ment discrimination statutes to the Senate, Congress has
confirmed that an employing office may consider a person's
party affiliation, domicile, and political compatibility. 10 3
This provision effects rough parity with political hiring in
the executive branch, which is constitutional when "party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved.' '10 4
Davis did not reach the question whether the Speech
or Debate privilege extends to employment decisions. Ob-
viously, however, there was little point in recognizing a spe-
cial constitutional claim if the Justices thought that it would
be wholly barred by the privilege. Davis seems to stand for
the proposition that congressional employment decisions
are not in themselves privileged "legislative acts." Never-
theless, the ordinary operation of the privilege may forestall
executive or judicial inquiries into the basis for employment
decisions when that basis concerns privileged activities.
This line of analysis would make the privilege apply as it
does for enforcement of the criminal law.
The lower courts have struggled to apply the privilege
faithfully to employment. In Walker v. Jones, °5 a former
manager of the House of Representatives restaurants
brought a due process suit against a member of Congress,
claiming that she had been dismissed because she was a wo-
man. The court held that the Speech or Debate Clause did
not bar the suit because this sort of proprietary function did
not involve the congressman's " 'conduct as a legisla-
103. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 316, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(105 Stat.) 1071, 1095-1096.
104. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980); see also Rutan v. Republican
Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
105. 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
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tor.' "106 Walker is surely correct-no aspect of the claim or
defense involved privileged activities.
Yet, in Browning v. Clerk, U.S. House of Representa-
tives,107 when an Official Reporter for the House brought a
due process suit alleging a dismissal due to race discrimina-
tion, the court held that immunity barred the suit because
the function of recording the testimony of witnesses in
hearings was "directly related to the due functioning of the
legislative process.'10 8 The Browning court rejected an ar-
gument that an aide's duties "must entail discretionary in-
put into the legislative process" to be protected. 10 9
Although the aide in Gravel had performed discretionary
functions in a close working relationship to the senator, the
Browning court emphasized that it would have to probe
legislative acts if the court reporter's claim and the em-
ployer's defense were to be fully considered. Since the con-
troversy revolved around the nature of mistakes made by
the reporter in taking testimony, Browning also seems to be
correct.
These cases demonstrate the probability that the privi-
lege will shield some, but not all, congressional employment
decisions from outside scrutiny, depending on an em-
ployee's proximity to privileged functions instead of the dis-
cretionary nature of the aide's job. 110
106. Id. at 931 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972)). The
Walker court distinguished Consumers Union of United States v. Periodical Corre-
spondents' Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976),'
which held that the privilege shielded arrangements for seating the press in the
House and Senate galleries, as involving issues that "immediately concerned House
consideration of proposed legislation." 733 F.2d at 930.
107. 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied en banc, 793 F.2d 380, cert. denied,
479 U.S. 996 (1986).
108. Id. at 929.
109. Id. at 928.
110. In the related context of official immunity from damages, the Supreme
Court has applied an approach that inquires into the "nature of the functions" which
give rise to the immunity, and that "evaluate[s] the effect that exposure to particular
forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions."
Forrester v. white, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)(holding that judicial immunity did not
protect a judge's dismissal of a probation officer). In Chastain v. Sundquist, 833
F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988), the court held that
congressmen have no immunity for common law torts committed within the scope of
their official duties but outside the constitutional privilege. However, in Walker, 733
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V. QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
When Congress investigates conditions in society or in
the other two branches of government, the Speech or De-
bate privilege shields the information-gathering process.
But when Congress or one of its members publicizes the
results, or when individual congressmen make constituent,
service inquiries to agencies, the immunity drops away.
These quasi-constitutional functions are unlikely to violate
the general criminal statutes, which do not focus on infor-
mational activities (in part because of First Amendment
sensitivities). Notwithstanding some lurid abuses of indi-
vidual rights in the loyalty investigations of the 1950s, which
placed Senator McCarthy in our lexicon as an "ism," the
Supreme Court has applied only weak controls to the valid-
ity of congressional investigative activity."' Fearing to con-
strain Congress' vital and legitimate needs to gather
information, the Court only requires that a committee's in-
vestigation be properly authorized by its house, that a par-
ticular inquiry be pertinent to a proper legislative purpose,
and that constitutional privileges, such as the right against
self-incrimination, be respected." 2
The quasi-constitutional functions of Congress resem-
ble similar executive branch activities of investigation, pub-
licity, and internal oversight. The executive analogues are
also only loosely controlled, in this case mostly by court-
made administrative law doctrine." 3 The courts appear to
have concluded that no matter who performs these func-
tions, they require broad discretion for their effective exer-
cise, notwithstanding their clear capacity for abuse. At
least the executive is somewhat constrained by congres-
sional oversight of its own informational functions. Neither
F.2d at 932-33, the court held that congressmen could claim qualified immunity from
damages for constitutional torts, as can executive officers.
111. Martin Shapiro, Judicial Review: Political Reality and Legislative Purpose:
The Supreme Court's Supervision of Congressional Investigations, 15 VAND. L. REV
535 (1962).
112. GRABOW, supra note 55, § 4.
113. See GLEN 0. ROBINSON, ERNEST GELLHORN & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, 357-403, 577-623 (4th ed. 1993).
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of the other two branches of government meaningfully
polices Congress." 4
Nor has Congress compiled a strong record of disci-
pline for abuses of quasi-constitutional power."15 The ab-
sence of criminal sanctions or internal congressional
discipline has left private tort plaintiffs as the primary
policers of these functions. The most prominent case is
Hutchinson v. Proxmire,116 which allowed a scientist to sue
Senator Proxmire for defamatory material contained in a
press release. The Court has repeatedly rejected arguments
by dissenting Justices for extending the Speech or Debate
privilege to cover such "informational" activities of Con-
gressmen.' 17 Given the strong First Amendment values that
buttress these activities, the Court may be confining the
scope of the privilege as a silent monument to the example
of Senator McCarthy.
In the wake of recent scandals surrounding interven-
tions by House Speaker Wright and by five senators with
federal regulators on behalf of constituents and contribu-
tors, both houses have considered strengthening their ethi-
cal standards for constituent service. No sharp break with
past practices has occurred to date, however. The underly-
ing dilemma of reconciling the need for vigorous oversight
of the executive with the reality of private campaign finance
is resistant to any simple, sweeping solution. At present,
such difficulties in effective congressional discipline suggest
the wisdom of retaining tort immunity as a deterrent to mis-
conduct and as a means to compensate those harmed by it.
114. In 1988, the American Bar Association adopted Guidelines Regarding the
Rights of Witnesses in Congressional Investigations. The Guidelines call for Con-
gress to allow witnesses the assistance of counsel, to respect constitutional and com-
mon law privileges, and otherwise to treat witnesses with fairness and respect.
115. Although the Senate eventually censured Joseph McCarthy, it was only af-
ter he had blasted the careers and reputations of his victims for years. See DAVID
HALBERSTAM, THE FIrIs, chs. 3 & 18 (1993).
116. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). See also Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988)(the court held that congressmen have no
immunity for common law torts committed within the scope of their official duties
but outside the constitutional privilege).
117. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 124-34; Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,
622-26 (1972).
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VI. PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS
When Congress performs its housekeeping functions of
employment, police, and general services, it resembles the
other two federal branches or state governments and pri-
vate businesses. The executive branch enforces statutes
regulating these activities by entities other than Congress.
The chief constitutional question about the application of
statutes involving proprietary functions to Congress is
whether the executive must be assigned the enforcement
responsibility, or whether Congress may employ its own
agents or even private persons such as arbitrators.
The constitutional issues are squarely presented by the
general mechanism for applying laws to Congress that the
House members of the Joint'Committee on the Organiza-
tion of Congress have recommended." 8 These members
have urged Congress to apply federal statutes "concerning
the terms and conditions of employment, protection from
discrimination in employment, and matters affecting the
health and safety of employees" throughout the legislative
branch." 9 They recommend the establishment of an Office
of Compliance within the legislative branch, to be headed
by a Board of Directors that is jointly appointed by the
leaders of both houses: "A bipartisan and bicameral ap-
pointment process ... seeks to ensure that they are ade-
quately insulated from political pressures in their
application of the laws and in the ultimate supervision of
the enforcement process.' 20
The Office would be charged to study which provisions
of federal law should apply and to make recommendations
to Congress. The two houses would apply the substance of
the statutory provisions to the legislative branch by concur-
rent resolution, pursuant to their constitutional power to
make rules for their own operations. The Office would
adopt procedural rules and would investigate and adjudi-
118. H.R. REP. No. 103-413, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. I, 22-23 (1993). As will
appear from the description in the text, this mechanism would be an expanded ver-
sion of the current operations of the House of Representatives' Office of Fair Em-
ployment Practices.
119. Id. at 22.
120. Id. at 23.
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cate complaints. The process for considering alleged viola-
tions of law is to include informal stages such as mediation,
followed by hearings before independent boards composed
of neutrals who are recommended by professional organiza-
tions. The boards would have subpoena power and would
hold hearings on the record. They could order compensa-
tion to be paid from funds to be set aside by each house.
Their decisions would be subject to review within the Of-
fice, after which any aggrieved employee or member could
seek judicial review. That review, in the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, would set aside decisions for errors
of fact, law, or procedure.
This scheme is in the normal pattern of administrative
law for adjudication of violations of civil statutes, with two
exceptions. The governing standards would be congres-
sional rules rather than statutes, and the enforcement per-
sonnel would be congressional employees and private
persons rather than executive branch employees. Several
Supreme Court cases throw serious doubt on the constitu-
tionality of this scheme. The Court has drawn a bright line
between legislative and executive functions, and has
evinced its determination to prevent Congress from con-
trolling execution except through its constitutional powers
such as legislation.
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,12 1 the Court invalidated all forms of the "legisla-
tive veto." This was a device by which Congress overturned
executive actions implementing statutes by passing a resolu-
tion of one or both houses. Since the Presentment Clauses
of article I, section 7, require all legislation to be presented
to the President for his signature or veto, the Court had to
determine whether the legislative veto was "essentially leg-
islative in purpose and effect. ' 122 The Court held that it
was, because when the House of Representatives passed a
resolution overriding an INS determination to allow a de-
portable alien to remain in the country, its action "had the
purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and
121. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
122. Id. at 952.
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relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Exec-
utive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the Legisla-
tive Branch. ' 123 In closing, the Court emphasized that
when Congress grants statutory power to the executive,
"Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until
that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.' '1 24
Chadha is often styled a formalist decision in that it
reasoned logically from the constitutional text and the
framers' general purpose to separate the branches, and
drew a conclusion that established categorical lines between
the functions of the branches. 125 If resort to the rulemaking
power to apply legal norms to Congress appears to be an
evasion of the constitutional requirements for legislation, it
would fall under Chadha. Arguments were sometimes
made that legislative vetoes were simply exercises of the
rulemaking power of Congress; the Chadha Court showed
no sympathy for them.
Even on its own formalist terms, Chadha may not ap-
ply to the functions of the proposed Office of Compliance,
which would alter legal rights and duties within the legisla-
tive branch. Hence, Congress' explicit constitutional power
to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings" would be read
as an exception to the requirements of the Presentment
Clauses for matters internal to regulation of the legislative
branch, but not for regulation of the public. This is cer-
tainly a plausible reading of the text of the Constitution,
and one that attempts to give full scope to both of the perti-
nent provisions. The Chadha Court explicitly stated that
congressional action need not follow the Presentment
Clause if the Constitution creates a separate process for
it.126
123. Id.
124. Id. at 955.
125. See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63
TEX. L. REV. 207 (1984); Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A
Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; E.
Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution,
and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125.
126. 462 U.S. at 955. The Court said that there "are four provisions in the Con-
stitution, explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may act alone with the
unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's veto." It theflisted only
the impeachment powers of the two houses and the Senate's powers to advise "and
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Formalist arguments, however, tend to engender for-
malist responses, and one is available here. The indispensa-
ble role of Congress' rulemaking power, and, therefore, a
possible definition of its scope, is to govern the exercise of
Congress' constitutional functions. For example, rules set
procedures for legislation, outline committee structure and
jurisdiction, and define the disciplinary processes for con-
gressmen. Hence, it is clear that action by either house to
punish, or even to expel, a member consists of the exercise
of explicit constitutional power under article I, section 5,
and need not follow the process of legislation. Using
rulemaking to apply legal norms to employees performing
proprietary functions, however, is well outside the core of
this power.
If formalist arguments are indeterminate, the Court
might turn to its main alternative approach to separation of
powers analysis. This is a "functional" one:
[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper
balance between the coordinate branches, the proper
inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitution-
ally assigned functions. Only where the potential for
disruption is present must we then determine whether
that impact is justified by an overriding need to pro-
mote objectives within the constitutional authority of
Congress.127
Functionalism, by balancing the needs of the branches,
tends to allow blended powers that a formalist would con-
demn.128 The Court has oscillated between the approaches
in recent years, selecting the strictness of formalism when it
consent to treaties and nominations. The omission of any reference to the equally
explicit powers of the houses under article I, § 5, must have been inadvertent, since
it bore no relation to the issues in the case. The Court did go on to note that pro-
posed constitutional amendments are another exception to the Presentment Clauses.
Id. at 955 n.21.
127. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (citation
omitted).
128., See generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Sepa-
ration-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488
(1987)., , .,
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perceives "the aggrandizement of congressional power at
the expense of a coordinate branch.' '1 29
To obtain relatively permissive judicial review of its
preferred method of applying law to itself, Congress needs
to make a persuasive argument that it is not aggrandizing
its own power or disrupting that of the executive. To ap-
praise the interests of the two branches in this context, we
need to consider the cases that delineate the scope of the
executive's appointment powers.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 3° the Court refused to allow Con-
gress to appoint members of the Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC), which regulates campaigns for federal elective
office. Congress had required the FEC, an independent
regulatory agency, to have two Commissioners appointed
by the President, two by the Speaker of the House, and two
by the President pro tern of the Senate. (The Secretary of
the Senate and the Clerk of the House were also to serve as
ex officio, nonvoting members.) This unique arrangement
undoubtedly reflected the political sensitivity of the FEC's
duties, which are to regulate candidates for Congress and
the Presidency.
The Court held that this scheme violated the Appoint-
ments Clause of the Constitution,' 3' which does not author-
ize congressional appointments of executive officers. The
Court held that "any appointee exercising significant au-
thority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Of-
ficer of the United States,' and must, therefore, be
appointed in the manner prescribed by [the Clause].' 32
The Court said that congressional appointees could perform
investigative and informative tasks of the sort that congres-
sional committees do, but that the FEC's duties to bring
129. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986).
130. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
131. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2: "[The President] shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments."
132. 424 U.S. at 126.
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civil enforcement actions, to promulgate regulations, and to
decide administrative adjudications could be done only by
"Officers of the United States."
Buckley was an easy formalist decision because the
Appointments Clause does not include Congress in its list
of those who may appoint executive officers. A functional
approach should have led to the some result, since Con-
gress would have fundamentally aggrandized its constitu-
tional role if it could have seized the appointments power
for federal regulators.
In Bowsher v. Synar,133 the Court invalidated the
"Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act"'134 because the Act was
partly administered by the Comptroller General, an officer
who is removable by joint resolution of Congress (the
equivalent of a statute), rather than by the President, as are
other executive officers. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for
the Court stated:
The Constitution does not contemplate an active
role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged
with the execution of the laws it enacts.... [T]he Con-
stitution explicitly provides for removal of Officers of
the United States by Congress only upon impeachment
.... A direct congressional role in the removal of of-
ficers charged with the execution of the laws beyond
this limited one is inconsistent with separation of pow-
ers.... To permit the execution of the laws to be vested
in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in
practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the ex-
ecution of the laws .... The structure of the Constitu-
tion does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it
follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under
its control what it does not possess. 135
The Court then defined execution broadly:
"[i]nterpeting a law enacted by Congress to implement the
legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the
law."1
36
133. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
134. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985).
135. 478 U.S. at 722-23, 26 (footnotes and citations omitted).
136. Id. at 733.
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Justice Stevens, concurring, was unsure the Comptrol-
ler's actions under the Act could properly be called "execu-
tive," but he argued that the Comptroller was an agent of
Congress due to the sum of his statutory responsibilities,
and that the Act gave him "the duty to make policy deci-
sions that have the force of law. 'u37 He concluded that
Congress must follow the constitutional process for legisla-
tion "when it makes policy that binds the Nation," either
directly or through an agent.
In Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citi-
zens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Incorporated
(MWAA), 138 the Supreme Court overturned another exten-
sion of congressional involvement into administration. In
MWAA, Congress authorized the transfer of control over
two major airports near the District of Columbia from the
Federal Aviation Administration to the MWAA, a regional
authority established by Virginia-D.C. compact. To assume
control of the airports, the MWAA Board of Directors had
to create a Board of Review with the power to veto certain
actions of the MWAA Directors. The nine members of the
Board of Review were required to be members of Con-
gress, "serving in their individual capacities, as representa-
tives of the users of the Metropolitan Washington
Airports;" eight of the nine had to be chosen from congres-
sional committees having jurisdiction over transportation
issues.
One of the first matters subjected to the Board of Re-
view's potential veto was a "master plan" providing for the
enhanced usage of National Airport, an airport especially
convenient to Capitol Hill and already the chronic target of
citizen complaints about aircraft noise. Six members of the
Court held that the Board of Review's power to veto deci-
sions by the MWAA Directors represented federal action
taken on behalf of Congress. Justice Stevens' majority
opinion noted the framers' fears of the legislature:
To forestall the danger of encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic
and related constraints on Congress. It may not "invest
137. Id. at 754 (Stevens, J., concurring).
138. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
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itself or its Members with either executive power or ju-
dicial power." And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and ex-
haustively considered procedures" specified in Article
I.... The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to
discuss the second constraint because the court was sat-
isfied that the power exercised by the Board of Review
over "key operational decisions is quintessentially exec-
utive." We need not agree or disagree with this charac-
terization [to] conclude that the Board of Review's
power is constitutionally impermissible. If the power is
executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of
Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Con-
gress must exercise it in conformity with the bicamera-
lism and presentment requirements .... 139
Hence, the scheme violated either Bowsher or Chadha,
and the majority felt no need to determine which was the
better characterization. The Court regarded the Act as "a
blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power
"140
In Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Vic-
tory Fund,141 a court of appeals interpreted Buckley and
MWAA strictly by holding that the continuing presence on
the FEC of the two nonvoting congressional appointees (a
matter not discussed in Buckley) was unconstitutional. The
court held that "the mere presence of agents of Congress
on an entity with executive powers offends the Constitu-
tion" because the congressional agents would necessarily
influence the other commissioners. As in MWAA, the court
thought the danger of congressional encroachment on the
executive justified a strict separation of powers approach.
Thus, the courts have made it clear that Congress may
not administer the laws it enacts, either directly through its
own members (MWAA), or indirectly by appointing (Buck-
139. Id. at 274-76 (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 277. Justice White and two others dissented, arguing that it was im-
plausible to regard Board of Review members as agents of Congress because Con-
gress did not appoint them, continuity in Congress or on any committee was not a
condition for completion of service on the Board, Congress could not remove Board
members, and Board members had no legal obligations to Congress.
141. 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3835 (U.S. June 20,
1994)(No. 93-1151).
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ley) or retaining removal power (Bowsher) over persons
who thereby become its agents. Nor may either house, or
both together, enact legislation without presentation to the
President (Chadha). How does congressional self-regula-
tion of its proprietary functions fare under these rules?
There is a straightforward reading of the cases that
would condemn it. Buckley instructs us that Congress can-
not assign its own appointees to perform "a significant gov-
ernmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law."'142 The
functions that Buckley would not allow congressional ap-
pointees to perform included regulation of members of
Congress by means of rulemaking and administrative adju-
dication. That is what the Office of Compliance would do.
(The followup NRA decision would not even allow congres-
sional appointees to sit with executive officers in a nonvot-
ing capacity, for fear of influence upon them.) Bowsher
emphasized that if Congress can remove those who execute
the law, it impermissibly controls them. Presumably, Con-
gress could remove the Office's Board of Directors and its
administrative personnel. If congressional agents select the
hearing officers, it may not matter if Congress cannot re-
move them-administrative law judges cannot be removed
easily by the executive, but that does not prevent them
from being executive officers for constitutional purposes. 1 43
Yet the Court's holding in Buckley, and especially its
broad statements that all execution of federal law must be
in the hands of federal officers, must be understood in con-
text. The Court considered the operation of an agency that
regulates not only congressmen but private persons con-
tending for federal office. Hence, many of the arguments
pressed on the Court, and rejected by it, would have sup-
ported congressional appointments to all kinds of regula-
tory agencies. The threat of congressional aggrandizement
was quite real. Congressional regulation that is confined to
the legislative branch presents no such threat.
Where Congress is not trying to seize the reins of ordi-
nary regulation from the executive, the Court has not taken
142. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 141 (1976).
143. See Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN.
L. REv. 329, 345-52 (1991).
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a strict formalist view of the Appointments Clause. Thus,
the Court has upheld the use of private arbitrators to exe-
cute statutory norms in some federal programs.'" Because
these cases concerned adjudicative functions, however, the
Court's concerns centered on the requisites of article III
and due process, not the Appointments Clause. The Court
has also blessed an executive agreement that transferred
claims pending in federal court to international arbitral
panels composed partly of foreign citizens who are emphat-
ically not "Officers of the United States.' '1 45
In these cases, the Court has never relied on another
constitutional provision that pertains to congressional self-
regulation. This is the Incompatibility Clause in article I,
section 6, which provides that "no Person holding any Of-
fice under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office." The Incompati-
bility Clause, which forbids Congress to execute the laws,
has never been interpreted by the Supreme Court. 46 That
does not render it unimportant, however. The basic nature
of our system of government depends on textual provisions
of the Constitution that have never been litigated because
their clarity has forestalled controversies that the framers
intended to prevent. 47
The effect of the Incompatibility Clause has been to
prevent the formation of a parliamentary form of govern-
144. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Schweiker
v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982); see generally Harold H. Bruff, Public Programs,
Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEX.
L. REV. 441 (1989).
145. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); see Harold H. Bruff, Can
Buckley Clear Customs?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309 (1992).
146. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), a
challenge to the possession of commissions in the military reserves by Congressmen
was turned aside for lack of the plaintiffs' standing to sue. In Metropolitan Washing-
ton Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., the Court dis-
claimed reliance on the Incompatibility Clause. 501 U.S. 252, 277 n.23 (1991).
147. For example, article I assures Congress the right to meet every year, and to
control who sits as a member. These provisions responded to abuses that had oc-
curred in seventeenth century England, when a king prorogued Parliament for
eleven years and when Cromwell's generals sat at the door of Parliament, determin-
ing who might enter. See generally HILL, supra note 3; ASHLEY, supra note 3.
Hence, fundamental guarantees of the autonomy of Congress lie partly in constitu-
tional commands that have (happily) lain beyond controversy.
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ment in the United. States. Ironically, its original purpose
was more to protect than to confine legislative power. The
framers, who kept a close eye on political developments in
the mother country, were aware of a longstanding contro-
versy over what was called "corruption.' 14 8 After restora-
tion of the monarchy in the seventeenth century, English
kings searched for ways to control the surging power of
Parliament. They began "corrupting" Parliament by offer-
ing its members lucrative executive positions, in hopes of
securing influence over them in their legislative capacity.
Hence, to our founding generation, joint officeholding
threatened to allow the executive undue influence over the
legislature. Without controversy, the Constitutional Con-
vention adopted the Incompatibility Clause to stop the
practice.
Ironically, the subsequent history of Great Britain
demonstrated that "corruption" works both ways. Joint of-
ficeholding soon became the mechanism by which Parlia-
ment worked its will with the executive. This point about
the potential effects of blended functions is fundamental to
the way we should view the modern operation of the In-
compatibility Clause. By drawing a bright line between our
own legislative and executive branches, the Incompatibility
Clause assures the autonomy of each from the other. The
generation and application of laws are then placed in dis-
tinct hands, reducing the potential for arbitrary treatment
of citizens. 149 Indeed, the spirit of the clause appears to ani-
mate the strict formalist cases that have prevented any
blending of legislative and executive functions, even though
the Court has chosen to rely on other, related constitutional
provisions such as the Appointments Clause. -°
148. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 78-
81, 174-75, 300-01 (1991); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 32-34, 107-14, 143-45 (1969).
149. The classic statement of this purpose of separation of powers is in THE FED-
ERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
150. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). The Myers Court
quoted Madison regarding the framers' purpose to separate legislative and executive
functions, to wit:
"If there is any point in which the separation of the Legislative and Execu-
tive powers sought to be maintained with great caution, it is that which
relates to officers and offices." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 581.
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This analysis somewhat refines the question we must
consider: where does the greater danger lie, in executive
harassment of Congress or in congressional encroachment
on executive responsibilities? If there is an identifiable in-
stitutional need to place enforcement in congressional
hands, the courts might be inclined to avoid the rigors of
formalism. The looser functional approach would ask
whether congressional self-regulation of proprietary activi-
ties can be justified in light of its potential to disrupt the
executive's performance of its constitutional functions. I
now turn to that inquiry.
The creation of an Office of Compliance would serve
important congressional autonomy interests. Both the con-
stitutional rulemaking power of Congress and the Speech
or Debate privilege embody those interests. Congress
could assert several justifications for avoiding executive en-
forcement of proprietary statutes.
First, as I have explained, the scope of the privilege is
unclear regarding the employment of principal staff person-
nel. Even if the Supreme Court eventually holds that con-
gressional employment decisions are never protected
legislative actions, it is possible for an employment contro-
versy to revolve around proof of those actions. For exam-
ple, if a fired staff member alleges discrimination, the
defense may be that the employee badly performed privi-
leged duties. Although congressmen can waive the privi-
lege and supply protected information to the executive, it is
doubtful that Congress can force its members to do so.
Therefore, the commingling of constitutional issues about
privilege in otherwise ordinary enforcement situations
could vitiate effective executive enforcement, unless the
ethics committees took on the role of obtaining and trans-
ferring information covered by the privilege.
Second, creation of an Office of Compliance would
present a closely bounded intrusion on executive enforce-
ment responsibilities. As long as the functions of the Office
are limited to enforcing statutes against the legislative
branch, substantial encroachments on the executive of the
272 U.S. at 116.
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kind that the Buckley Court apparently feared cannot arise.
For about 40,000 federal employees, a tiny fraction of the
whole number, responsibility for enforcing federal laws
would lie with their own branch, rather than the executive.
The mechanism, if sustained, would not provide a prece-
dent for congressional enforcement of statutes against the
public, as long as it is based on a rationale that stresses the
need of Congress to avoid direct assaults on its indepen-
dence from the executive. No such need could be shown
for the ordinary operation of statutes outside Capitol Hill.
Third, Congress could argue plausibly that self-regula-
tion might be more effective than executive enforcement. I
argued above that executive branch prosecutors seem more
likely to underenforce criminal laws against congressmen
than to overenforce them, because of the executive's de-
pendence on Congress. It seems doubtful that enforcement
of civil statutes would present a different pattern. Hence, it
is possible that an internal Office of Compliance would be
more vigorous than an executive version that quailed
before congressional powers of retaliation.
Fourth, since disclosure of information about miscre-
ance is a particularly potent weapon against elected offi-
cials, there is cause for concern about vesting control of
such information in the hands of an institutional rival.
Either general overdeterrence of congressional conduct
from the very presence of an executive overseer or targeted
executive harassment of political enemies could result.
If abuse by an executive branch enforcement entity
were to occur, it might be especially difficult for Congress
to protect its autonomy effectively. Retaliatory powers can
be one thing in theory and another in practice. Once Con-
gress creates an Office of Compliance, of whatever sort, it
will become extremely difficult politically to hamstring or
abolish it. A pattern of executive abuse that one might an-
ticipate would unfold as follows. The executive, finding a
congressman or a principal staff aide to be a thorn in its
side, would investigate that congressional office much more
thoroughly than those of more compliant members. Parti-
san politics would likely identify the fault lines of institu-
tional strain here. Given the complexity of most of the
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regulatory regimes to which Congress might subject itself,
intense investigation would be sure to discover at least tech-
nical violations of statute or regulation. Vigorous enforce-
ment action would ensue, amid publicity about the
scofflaws discovered in Congress. Given the power of such
publicity, especially when exploited by a political opponent
at the next election, effective response by an unjustly
treated congressman or aide might be .impossible. Ulti-
mately, the executive would succeed in wearing down and
purging its opponents in Congress.
I do not think this is a likely scenario. Yet, if Congress
chooses to endorse it as a rationale for creating an internal
Office of Compliance, I cannot say their conclusion would
be beyond reason. In our system of elaborately checked
and balanced powers, virtually every check that one branch
has over another has been abused sometime in our history.
There does seem to be enough potential for abuse of an
executive enforcement agency to warrant the courts in tak-
ing the relatively permissive functional approach to blended
powers in this instance. Finding some legitimate reason for
Congress to fear executive disruption of its institutional au-
tonomy, and finding no reason to fear substantial congres-
sional encroachment on executive branch functions, the
courts should conclude that there is sufficient constitutional
justification for a legislative branch enforcement agency.
An institutional alternative exists, however, that may
affect this calculus. Congress could honor the Constitu-
tion's usual placement of enforcement responsibilities in ex-
ecutive hands while dampening the possibility of executive
disruption of congressional operations by creating an in-
dependent regulatory commission to apply statutes to Con-
gress. The usual format for such an agency features a multi-
member governing body whose members serve long, stag-
gered terms and who must be appointed from both political
parties. Examples include the Federal Election Commis-
sion and the Federal Trade Commission. The President ap-
points the members with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and may remove them for misconduct or other
153
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specified cause.' The purpose of the independent com-
mission form is to render regulation "relatively immune
from the 'political winds that sweep Washington.' "152
Claims have arisen that independent agencies are un-
constitutional when employed for ordinary regulation of
the public.153 The Supreme Court has announced that it
will invalidate the removal restrictions that are the hall-
mark of independence if "they impede the President's abil-
ity to perform his constitutional duty" in a particular
case.154 It may be that most existing independent regula-
tory agencies will clear this doctrinal hurdle. 55 In any
event, an independent commission designed to enforce laws
against Congress would have to be subject to sufficient
presidential powers of removal to allow him to assure the
faithful execution of the laws.
In the precedent that is most closely on point, Mistretta
v. United States, 56 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the United States Sentencing Commission. The Commis-
sion, an independent agency in the judicial branch that is
composed of executive officers and federal judges, issues
mandatory sentencing guidelines for federal criminal trials.
Thus, Mistretta upheld independent regulation of the fed-
eral judiciary. 57 Employing functional analysis, the Court
could find no danger of encroachment or aggrandizement
in this scheme. In the Court's view, the statute neither un-
dermined the integrity of the judiciary nor expanded its
power dangerously by uniting the rulemaking powers of the
151. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
152. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836
(1986)(quoting H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 44 (1974); see gener-
ally SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 5 STUDY
ON FEDERAL REGULATION (Comm. Print 1977).
153. See, e.g., Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (1987); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
154. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
155. See generally Peter M. Shane, Independent Policy Making and Presidential
Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596 (1989); Glen 0.
Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 1988
DUKE L.J. 238.
156. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
157. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law
Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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Commission with the judicial power of the courts. The rea-
son there was no such unification of judging and policymak-
ing was that, although located within the judicial branch,
the Commission was "an independent agency in every rele-
vant sense,' ' 15 rather than part of the hierarchy of the fed-
eral courts. Moreover, because sentencing discretion had
long lain within the judiciary, creation of the Commission
had not "aggrandized the authority of that Branch or...
deprived the Executive Branch of a power it once
possessed.' u59
Mistretta supports the power of Congress to create an
independent commission to apply statutes to the legislative
branch. Such a statute would not materially alter the ex-
isting balance of power among the branches. First, it would
not increase congressional authority overall. As in Mis-
tretta, enhanced regulation within a branch leaves its power
"if anything, somewhat diminished."' 60 Second, the statute
would not deprive the executive of any existing authority.
Equally important, as the Mistretta Court stressed, self-reg-
ulation within a branch needs to have structural insulation
from the daily constitutional functions of that branch if it is
to avoid disrupting them and if it is to have integrity.
Hence, Congress could avoid the constitutional doubts
that would surround an Office of Compliance headed by
congressional appointees if it created an independent com-
mission to perform this task. It may not matter whether
Congress styles this entity as being located "within the leg-
islative branch." Since the commission's function would
clearly be execution of the law, its constitutionality would
be assured only if, like the Sentencing Commission, it is
headed by Officers of the United States, rather than con-
gressional appointees.
Congress need not fear that placing power in the Presi-
dent to nominate and to remove members of such a com-
mission would allow him to encroach on congressional
autonomy by placing only persons hostile to or ignorant of
Congress on the commission. The Senate's check of advice
158. 488 U.S. at 393.
159. Id. at 395.
160. Id.
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and consent is one control. In addition, Congress could em-
ploy its power to set qualifications for federal office not
only to require party balance among nominees but also to
command that some or all of them have prior experience as
members or staff of Congress. Also, Congress could claim
an informal role in being consulted about prospective nomi-
nees, as it now plays for the Federal Election Commission
and for the inferior federal courts.
Several of the policy considerations that usually sup-
port the application of laws to Congress would counsel use
of an executive enforcement mechanism. The perils of ex-
ecutive enforcement constitute an important part of the
burden of statutes for citizens. Although an executive
agency probably cannot be made to treat congressional per-
sonnel exactly the same as it treats ordinary citizens, the
nature of enforcement would surely be more unitary than
under a special congressional entity. This would maximize
the information to Congress about the actual operation of
its statutes.
Executive enforcement would also maximize parity of
obligations on private and public citizens alike. Congres-
sional enforcement mechanisms, by providing for the tailor-
ing of legal rules to recognize the special characteristics of
Congress, do risk the elision of apparently minor elements
of a statutory scheme that actually affect the public criti-
cally. Mundane administrative features such as record-
keeping and reporting requirements are the regular target
of complaints by the regulated.
It may not be possible for congressional self-regulation
to obtain full public confidence. There are signs that con-
gressional employees have never trusted the independence
of existing internal enforcement entities.161 As the framers
of the Constitution understood, legislation and enforcement
need to be in separate hands for the process to be
trustworthy.
In light of these considerations, I conclude that the in-
dependent commission form would be a better way to per-
161. See Application of Laws and Administration of the Hill: Hearings Before the
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 114-34
(1993).
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form this function than an Office of Compliance headed by
congressional employees. By subjecting itself to a form of
regulation most similar to the one that governs the public,
Congress would best assure "that the laws shall bind
equally on all."
VII. THE CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
The scheme that Congress eventually enacted to apply
legislation to itself follows the general lines of the proposals
of the House members of the Joint Committee on the Or-
ganization of Congress that I have discussed, but with some
important modifications. I believe that the changes ade-
quately respond to the constitutional concerns that at-
tended the earlier formulation.
The Congressional Accountability Act applies to the
employees of the House and Senate and to such immediate
support organizations as the Capitol Police and the Con-
gressional Budget Office.162 For the most part, it excepts
the Library of Congress, the General Accounting Office,
and the Government Printing Office, which were already
partially covered by law. 63 As a result, the Act nestles
close to the core of the legislative branch, and excludes
some of the proprietary functions for which there is rela-
tively little justification for legislative branch enforcement
techniques.
The Act directly applies the core substantive provisions
of eleven federal statutes to Congress.164 The most impor-
tant of these are: The Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
the Age Discrimination Act, the Family and Medical Leave
Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, and the statutes defining labor-management re-
lations in the federal service. Thus, Congress has met the
Joint Committee's goal of invoking the statutes that govern
terms of employment, protection from discrimination, and
guarantees of employee health and safety.
162. Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 101 (1995).
163. See supra note 31.
164. Pub. L. No. 104-1, Title 11 (1995).
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The Act will be administered by an Office of Compli-
ance within the legislative branch, headed by a Board of
Directors who are congressional appointees. 165 The Act
contains a complex scheme for the Board's adoption of sub-
stantive regulations, which is obviously designed to allay
constitutional concerns. First, most of the provisions that
apply particular federal statutes to congressional employees
contain a requirement that the Board's regulations "shall
be the same as" those promulgated by the executive branch
official who usually administers the statute, "except insofar
as the Board may determine, for good cause shown.., that
a modification ... would be more effective for the imple-
mentation of the rights and protection under this sec-
tion. ' 166 Second, after the Board adopts regulations, they
are approved by any of three methods: simple resolution of
the house to which they apply; concurrent resolution of
both Houses; or joint resolution, which requires the assent
of the President.167 The Board's recommendation to Con-
gress regarding which method to apply will doubtless de-
pend on whether there is enough variance from the text of
the statute and the regulations of the executive to support
an argument that new law is being made, so that presenta-
tion to the President is required.
The Act contemplates a process for complaints and
hearings that tracks the earlier proposals. The Office will
appoint hearing officers to hold adjudications. On appeal,
the Board will review the records of the hearings. Judicial
review follows in the Federal Circuit, under a normal ad-
ministrative law "substantial evidence" standard.168 The
Act authorizes judicial review of the Board's regulations
under the Administrative Procedure Act's normal
criteria. 169
165. Id. at Title III.
166. E.g., id. § 215(d)(2) (OSHA).
167. Id. § 304.
168. Id. § 407. In civil rights cases, under § 408 an employee can elect an action
in district court instead of the Board's adjudicatory process.
169. Id. § 409. Regulations that have been adopted by joint resolution are, how-
ever, only to be reviewed for constitutionality, since they are the equivalent of
statutes.
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This scheme should be safe from constitutional invali-
dation. The Act's principal departure from earlier propos-
als lies in its application of norms to Congress by statute
rather than by rules of the houses. Similarly, federal court
review can focus on statutory provisions, not internal con-
gressional regulations. These steps should go far to satisfy
Chadha's emphasis that the rulemaking power of Congress
may not have the effects of law on the rights of citizens.
Still, the Act authorizes congressional employees to
promulgate regulations to implement the statutes. Under
Buckley, does this constitute execution of the law that must
be performed by executive branch officers? I think not, for
several reasons. First, the Act stays sufficiently near the
core support functions of Congress for the regulations to
derive some support from the constitutional rulemaking
power of Congress. In contrast, Buckley involved regula-
tion of many persons having no current affiliation with
Congress. Second, the Act requires the regulations to con-
form to the executive branch's substantive regulations un-
less there is good reason to vary them. Hence, executive
enforcement policy will have at least indirect influence
within Congress, and will often have binding force.
Certainly Congress may-indeed it should-design a
mechanism for adapting executive regulations to the special
institutional nature of Congress. When there is a need for
substantial addition to the statutory text or substantial vari-
ation from an executive branch regulation, Congress can
adopt a joint resolution that is the equivalent of a new stat-
ute. Otherwise, the congressional regulations can have the
ambiguous legal effect of interpretive regulations of the ex-
ecutive branch. These regulations lack the force of law, but
courts defer to any persuasive effect that they possess. 7 °
The fact that they will be administered by congressional
rather than executive officers should be adequately justified
by the reluctance of Congress to subject its personnel to the
enforcement efforts of a rival branch of government.
170. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A
GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 52-69 (2d ed. 1991).
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